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A Proposal for
a Non-Earnings Related
Retirement Income Scheme
Harry Glasbeek

There are many acknowledged defects in private
pension schemes as they are presently administered: vesting requirements are long, most plans
are not portable, plans are subject to insolvencies,
and benefits are inadequate because, among other
reasons, they are not indexed for inflation. In this
article, Harry Glasbeek argues that there is little
hope that these defects in private pension schemes
will be remedied since the primary motivation
behind their entrenchment was not to provide
retirement income for employees, but was to provide certain benefits for employers such as a more
stable work force, the easier retirement of less productive workers, and the accumulation of a large
private investment fund. Indeed he argues that,
ironically and in spite of their expressed ideology,
those who seriously argue that private pensions
can be improved invariably end up making suggestions that would have private pension schemes
take on the characteristics of a public pension
scheme. He concludes by arguing the case for
abolishing private pensions and substituting a
public non-earnings related scheme.
Harry Glasbeek is a professor of law at
Osgoode Hall Law School.

This paper will first concentrate on the argument
that private pension schemes cannot be designed to provide adequate retirement income. Then an argument
will be made that retirement income should be provided
for by mechanisms other than forced savings.
This bald and bold statement sounds very much as
if I see myself as Alexander, cutting the Gordian Knot.
The contrary is true. I am not an economist nor am I a
taxation lawyer - the kinds of professionals who dominate the pension-income retirement discussion and debate. In particular, I class myself as a labour lawyer
whose major concern is the development of policies
which advance the cause of employees.
When I came to look at pension schemes, both
private and public, I arrived at the conclusion that
employees and their dependants tend to be net losers
186

under such schemes. This finding led me, firstly, into an
inquiry as to why this should be so and, then, to make
the suggestions put forward in this paper.
Pension schemes have two tangible end-products:
(a) benefits for employees, and (b) the creation of large
pools of capital for the purposes of investment. The
arguments which follow are organized so that the issue
of whether or not employees receive worthwhile benefits
is directly confronted, whereas the second end-product,
the accumulation of capital, is evaluated in the particular context of the controversy which revolves around
the issue of public versus private pension plan schemes.

I Employee Benefits
Trick or Truck
If employees receive no benefits at all from a particular type of pension scheme or if they receive less
than full benefit for what they have had to give up to
obtain the promise of the benefit, the scheme will be
defective. It is my belief that it can be shown, relatively
easily, that all earnings-related pension schemes are
defective in this way. I will discuss this in relation to
private pension plan schemes.
As a labour lawyer, evaluating pension schemes
established by employers, I begin with a certain skepticism because of a practice which was particularly
prevalent in the nineteenth century and which still occasionally surfaces in these modern times. I refer here to
the mode of payment which came to be labelled 'payment in truck.' Typically, an employer, instead of paying the agreed rate of wages in cash, would offer his
employees goods in lieu of cash. This led to abuse.
Over-valuation of goods was common. Frequently, employees could not get the goods elsewhere, nor could
they get paid in any other way. The actual wage rate was
thus eroded. There were many variants of such techniques which were used by employers to achieve this objective. One of these involved setting up a system
whereby vouchers were given to employees instead of
wages and these vouchers could only be redeemed at a
CANADIAN TAXATION/WINTER, 198
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particular pub. The pub-keeper would give cash on the
spot for vouchers offered to him on pay-day. Consequently, spouses would meet workers at their place of
work on pay-day to accompany them to the 'pub-bank.'
An amusing but telling story is that, in coal mining
towns in Wales, workers used to hide their wives' shoes
on pay-day so that they could not come to meet them.
Truck practices were so endemic that legislation had to
be passed to stop them.' Employers were resourceful
people, however, and statute after statute had to be
passed to overcome loopholes they detected in the legislation. (Tax lawyers are not the only people with this
kind of ingenuity!) Today, in The Employment StandardsAct in Ontario we find a provision which says that
no one shall be paid in anything but cash.2 Such a provision is testimony to the fact that employees are in a position of such potential exploitation by employers that
they require legislative assistance. There are some exceptions to this modern 'truck' legislation: there may be a
charge against wages for board and food (up to a
limited amount) and certain deductions, such as union
dues and cpr contributions, may also be made from the
wages payable to the employee. The pervasiveness of the
notion that pension schemes are worthwhile is demonstrated here by the fact that deductions from wages by
an employer are allowable in respect of registered pension plans.
What seems clear from this excursus is that history
teaches us that we have to be vigilant in preventing
employers from eroding employee wages by trick or
deception. It strikes me that private pension schemes
have some truck, or if you wish, trick-like features.

the thinking on this subject, it seems to be undoubted
today that contributions to pension schemes are a form
of deferred wages. 6 Since employer contributions are
wages which might otherwise have been paid to employees it follows that, by not having those contributions
repaid to them when they leave their employment, they
have had their wage rates eroded, or, if you wish, they
have been tricked out of their rightful earnings.' Pension schemes are thus, incontrovertibly, a form of truck
payment. The folklore about the value of pension
schemes must be truly insidiously persuasive to permit
us to tolerate them when we have manifestly set our face

1.
2.
3.

4.

[T]he saviours of private enterprise
plans are attempting to make them into
something for which they were not
designed.
An employee will not be entitled to receive benefits
from her or his participation in a pension scheme unless
contributions have been made by her or him, or on her
or his behalf, for a prescribed period known as the
vesting period. In some jurisdictions this is regulated by
statute.3 In those private pension schemes in which
employees contribute directly to the fund, they will be
entitled to recover their own contributions plus interest
should they withdraw from the scheme before vesting.
This happens quite frequently since many people leave
their employment before their pensions are vested. 4 Inasmuch as they can recoup their contributions plus interest, the fact that they accepted less wages in their pay
packet to qualify for a potential pension benefit does
not mean that they have suffered a loss.' But, inasmuch
as the employer made contributions on behalf of the
employees, should they leave their employment before
the vesting of benefits, they will not be able to claim
such contributions. Now, whatever once may have been
CANADIAN TAXATION/WINTER, 1980
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See R.W. Rideout, Principles of Labour Law (London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 1972), p. 142.
There are similar provisions in other jurisdictions.
By statute, in six provinces this time period is not to exceed 10
years and the reaching of age 45 by an employee. Prior to such
enactments, vesting periods could be as long as a requirement to
remain employed with one employer up to age 65 or such other
age as the employer decreed. Today, employees sometimes succeed in bargaining for shorter vesting periods than the statutes
prescribe as a maximum.
There are no national data about pension coverage of employees
through time, but there are some alarming indications. The
R6gie des Rentes du Qu6bec looked at the circumstances of
32,939 employees who withdrew from plans to determine how
many of them would have satisfied the new statutory vesting requirements. It was found only 3.1 per cent of the withdrawing
employees would have met the requirements; see Les R'gimes de
Retraite en'Qudbec, No. 3, (Quebec 1976), pp XXIX - XXXVI.
The Economic Council of Canada in its study, People and Jobs:
A Study of the Canadian Labour Market (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1976), found that, of males between the ages of 18 - 24,
over 80 per cent left their employer within four years and, of
males over 45, about 60 per cent left within the same four years.
For females, the figures were slightly worse. While this does not
necessarily mean that such employees would never work
anywhere long enough to have benefits vest, they are dramatic
figures. After all, of those few who do stay longer than four
years, how many would stay the extra six years usually required?
And of those who do, how much longer than ten years in a, say,
40-year working life will they work with one employer? The
shorter the span, the smaller the pension.
This cannot, however, be asserted with certitude. The interest
paid may not match the interest obtainable in the market. Further, for some employees with specific consumer needs, wages at
an earlier date may have been worth more than wages and interest in a lump sum at a later point of time.
That is, payments made on behalf of employees would have been
paid by way of wages to them if there had been no pension plan.
See J.E. Pesando and S.A. Rae, Public and Private Pensions in
Canada: An Economic Analysis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977); J.E. Pesando, Private Pensions in an Inflationary Climate: Limitations and Policy Alternatives (Ottawa:
Economic Council of Canada, 1979), p. 13; Gray v. Kerslake,
[1968] S.C.R.3.
This does not mean that employers automatically reap a direct
pecuniary benefit. The contributions left behind will support the
continuing plan. But neither does it mean that there will be some
rough equalization because new workers who left their other
employment before vesting now take advantage of the leftbehind money and that the ones who left that money behind will,
in turn, benefit from other employees' left-behind contributions.
Schemes are not set up that way, nor will employees necessarily
move from one pension scheme place to another.
187
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against all other truck practices. Note also at this point
that the loss in benefits which is entailed in not having
properly indexed pension schemes has not been referred
to in the discussion so far. Clearly, it is not difficult to
make an argument that the failure to adequately index
pension schemes also amounts to a loss of earned wages
for employees when they receive them as cost-of-living
affected benefits.

Inherent Barriers to Improvements
of Employee Benefits
As private pension schemes have come under attack
in recent times, their defendants have acknowledged
that there are serious defects with the existing schemes.
In particular, the perceived difficulties have been long
vesting requirements, the failure to provide adequate
portability, the lack of guarantee against insolvencies,
and inadequate benefits such as survivors' benefits. Accordingly, many proposals have been made to improve
the schemes in these respects. But, no matter how
sincerely people attempt to improve private pension
schemes, their efforts are unlikely to be successful. This
is so since the end result of improvements in pension
schemes, namely, better benefits to employees, is not
the true underlying purpose of private pension funds.
This requires elaboration.
Why did private pension schemes begin at all?
What is notable is that, initially, they were the creations
of employers. I do not want to be overly cynical, but it
seems to me that the history of employer/employee relationships does not show that employers have gone out
of their way to shower benefits on their employees.
Employees only got what they extracted through the use
of economic power. The truck payment situation is but
a minor example of the fierce battle that has been
fought over the last few centuries between employers
and employees. If that is an accurate assessment of the
reality of the economic relationship between employers
and employees, it becomes necessary to look elsewhere
than generosity for an explanation as to why employers
initiated pension schemes. Explanations are not hard to
find.
Firstly, it is clearly in the employer's interest to
have a stable workforce. A stable workforce not only
means retention of experienced workers, it also means
that a great deal of money will be saved. The cost of
replacing workers in certain industries and industrial
positions may be very high.' Retirement income
schemes can promote this aim. This objective is, of
course, in conflict with the employee's interest in having
maximum mobility in times of full employment. Secondly, pension schemes not only enable the employer to
keep experienced employees who are at the peak of their
skills and productive capacity, but they also make it
easier to retire them when they become less productive.
The provision of a retirement income makes the employer much less of a dragon when he asks employees to
make way for more productive workers. 9 Thirdly, the
188

good public relations employers earned by voluntarily
providing income benefits while giving themselves the
opportunity to retire workers, also enabled them (in
those days when it was a more important factor than it
is today) to persuade their employees not to join a
union. The argument would simply have been that the
discretionary pension scheme would not be maintained
if unionization was accepted by the workforce.' 0
Fourthly, the creation of general employee pension
plans enabled the managers and owners of small,
closely-held operations to provide themselves with more
munificent pension schemes than they otherwise might
have had.I'
These selfish objectives for setting up pension plans
were made attractive by the fact that employers felt that
it was cheap to attain them. They were paid for by what
would otherwise have been the direct payment of wages
to employees. This relates back to the argument made a
little earlier that contributions to pension plans are
merely deferred wages. Remuneration by provision of
fringe benefits is still remuneration. If the payment of
remuneration in the form of fringe benefits yields
benefits which the payment of wages does not, it is
doubly useful. Indeed, the recent spectacular growth of

Bernstein reports that the average turnover cost for one
employee in 1960 was $500; for clerical and machine production
maintenance workers the cost could run anywhere from $50 to
$6,000 per worker turned over. M.C. Bernstein, The Future of
Private Pensions (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p.
11, citing F. Gaudet, Labour Turnover.: Calculation and Cost
(New York: American Management Association, 1960), pp. 37,
60. One imagines these figures might be even higher today.
9. The employer's interest in being able to get rid of workers with
diminishing productivity is real and employer-instituted pension
plans frequently give the employer a discretion to retire
employees, on a pension, at particular ages well below the usual
retirement age. Thus the submission made by Canadian National
to the Senate, Special Senate Committee on Retirement Age
Policies, Proceedings, No. 19, (Feb. 20, 1979), argued (at pp. 20,
21) that if retirement income provisions were altered so that it
could no longer forcibly retire employees under the discretion
given by the pension plan, this "would necessitate the implementation of a alternate method of terminating unproductive
employees. Some system of performance standards would have
to be put in place." Apart from its complexity, this new need
would be unwelcome because the trade unions would resist. They
would do so because of the subjective aspects of performance
evaluation and, more importantly, because the present scheme
enables them to help create opportunities for younger, inexperienced workers, without obviously harming older ones. A
similar submission was made by Amoco Canadian Petroleum
Company Ltd; see Senate, Special Senate Committee on Retirement Age Policies, Proceedings,No. 17A, (Feb. 13, 1979) esp. pp.
12-13. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada has supported this employer advantage by ruling that early retirement
provisions were to be distinguished from discharge and thus did
not require the employer to show just cause for termination. See
Bell Canada v Office & Professional Employees' International
Union, [1974] S.C.R.335.
10. The converse may well happen now: employers faced with
escalating bargaining demands may threaten that they will close
down, causing unemployment and loss of accumulated pension
rights.
11. See generally Bernstein, supra note 8, ch. 11.
8.
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pension plans in the private sector is largely attributable
to recognition of this concept. Whenever it has been impossible because of government-imposed wage freezes
to increase workers' wages up to a level that the
employer was willing to pay, ingenious use of pension
planning has been made to augment the workers' earnings. The recent anti-inflation legislation in Canada provides a good example. During its reign, expertise in
devising pension schemes became a new, invaluable
vocation. A careful reading of the statute revealed that
payment by way of funding extra pension benefits permitted the wage restraints to be eluded. Unions, in the
face of the legislation, asked for such extra benefits.
Employers frequently acceded.1 2 The logic inherent in
all this suggests that, if the cost of paying for a pension
scheme increases employer costs to a level above that
which the employer would be willing to pay employees
directly by way of wages, it is unlikely that the employer
will see sufficient benefit in the pension scheme to willingly make such a contribution.
Although the initial impetus for the establishment
of pension schemes came from employers seeking advantage, it is also true that unions have become increas-

For those [employees] who believe that
the employer/employee relationship is
an aspect of class warfare, it must seem
rather strange that, having fought very
hard to obtain a particular wage, it is to
be given back to the enemy in order that
the enemy may use it to exploit other
workers (perhaps themselves as well).
ingly supportive of private pension schemes. Union endorsement of private pension bargaining has been motivated by two main concerns. Firstly, in view of the fact
that, unlike employers, unions are interested in providing employees with adequate retirement incomes and
in view of the fact that such incomes were not adequately provided for in any other way, it was logical for
unions to seek to help their members by negotiating
private pension agreements, given some employers' interest in creating them. Linked to this is the second
reason. When unions first began to support private pension schemes there were no government schemes of any
note in existence. It appears that they felt that, if they
could make employers support pension schemes, then,
because of the mounting cost, the employers would join
the unions in lobbying governments into setting up
governmentally supported schemes. In the event, as can
be seen from our present situation, the unions' plan
misfired. Although in Canada there has been some
direct action by governments (the creation of the
Canada and Qu6bec Pension Plans), the main response
of government has been to give employers tax deductions for any contributions made to private pension
plans. This, of course, has meant that there is no
CANADIAN TAXATION/WINTER, 1980

pressure on employers to do away with private pension
plans since the increased cost to them is largely passed
on to the taxpayers. To underscore how little cost
pressure has been put on employers, it is to be noted
that the government only permits employers to make tax
deductions if the pension plan is a retirement one. That
is, government support for private pension plans is
directly linked to the employers' desiderata of stabilizing
their work forces and permitting them to retire workers
as they become less productive. The notion that private
pension plans, as envisaged by employers, are to remain
a mainstay of our retirement income planning thus
seems entrenched.
Employees, again as opposed to employers, clearly
have an interest in having adequate retirement income.
But this does not mean all employees have an interest in
having less wages now in return for deferred wages
given to them as retirement income. It is manifest that at
various points of a worker's life, her or his needs for
cash-in-hand will change drastically. Thus, an older and
more senior employee, one who has made most of her or
his purchases relating to housing, furniture and the like
and who has overcome most of the burdens of educating
her or his family, may have a much greater interest in
setting aside wages in a forced savings plan than would a
younger worker who still has all those expenses and
hopes in front of her or him. (Pensions are a form of
forced savings plan. Although this is obvious, it is worth
noting this aspect of pensions in a society which prides
itself on freedom of choice and which supports private
pension planning because they are private sector,
entrepreneurially-promoted schemes.) The fact that
many employees would rather have higher wages than
be forced to save for their retirement is illustrated by the
statistics that show that when employees get a chance to get
their own pension contributions back most show a
remarkable interest in having cash-in-hand.' 3 Indeed,
the lure of being able to get one's own contributions plus
interest back may be sufficient incentive for an
employee to leave one job for another. Also, in this
catalogue of items showing that employees should not
and do not unanimously accept the present private peqsion schemes, Nader and Blackwell in their study on
pensions found that of 500 people who answered a questionnaire which, amongst other things, surveyed for attitudes, only 9 more people opted for a private system of
pensions than opted for a comprehensive social security
system which would provide higher benefits than the
social security system offered at the time of the
survey. 14

12.
13.

14.

For an exposition of these developments see Financial Post, Dec.
22, 1980, pp. SI-Slo.
The estimate cited suggests that 90 per cent of employees who
leave their employ before their contributions are locked-in, opt
for taking them out even though this means they forfeit the
employer's contributions; see J. Fichaud, "Pensions - A Primer
for Lawyers," 2 Dalhousie Law J. 369, 380 (1975-76).
R. Nader and K. Blackwell, You and Your Pension (New York:
Grossman Publishers, 1973), Appendix A.
189
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I have argued that the benefits to employees of
earnings-related private pension schemes are seriously
undermined by poor portability, vesting and indexing
provisions. Thus many employees lose some of whatever wage advantage they have obtained by hard bargaining.I5 In addition, pension schemes do not result in
substantial benefits being obtained even by those few
people who eventually have their wages plus interest returned to them by way of retirement income.' 6 Yet,
there is persistent movement and agitation for the retention and, indeed, the augmentation of private pension
schemes. If private pension schemes are to be improved
and rendered more palatable to our society, costs must
be increased. But these costs can be so increased only if
employers, governments or wage earners are willing to
accept them. Now, since employers are not primarily
interested in providing adequate retirement incomes but
have other more selfish objectives, which can be served
by the present private pension schemes, they will not
want to bear that cost. The proof is in the pudding: so
far, they have not borne it. The government could bear
the increased costs but since at this juncture we are concerned with the continued viability of private pensions
as such (presumably because there is something good
about private sector planning), the notion that governments should pick up a significant part of the tab for
these necessitated increased benefits seems somewhat incongruous. This leaves us with wage earners. However,
there is no reason to believe that employees would be
willing to accept the extra burden of increased benefits
to them: under the private pension scheme system, better retirement incomes would then mean less take home
pay. That trade-off is made now. Conceivably, the forced
savings component could be increased. But the upper

sense that workers have the capacity and willingness to
accept a forced saving of a particular amount. That
amount, then by definition, becomes 'adequate.' But, of
course it may be totally inadequatefor the purposes of
living a good and decent life as a retired worker.

Indexation as a Special Problem
Private pension plan proponents recognize the need
to improve benefits. They also acknowledge that costs
will increase. They seem to believe that there is a willingness to bear such extra costs. But is there?
One of the real deficiencies of the present schemes
is that when the deferred wages (plus interest) are finally
paid to wage-earners, the decrease in value of money as
the result of inflation may make the return worth much
less to the workers than they might have hoped for. To
off-set this loss, pension benefits need to be indexed to
increases in the cost of living. Actuaries should be able

15.

(J)ust as there are many people perhaps
who are concerned about the possible
abuse the government would make of
large sums of new capital, there are also
many people who are concerned about
the possible abuses inherent in the
private sector having such a large sum
of capital available to it as a result of
the existence of private pension plans.
16.

limit to such a new accommodation may be reached very
quickly, at a much lower level than the minimum required to provide benefits sufficiently high to make
private sector schemes palatable. Indeed, as private pension schemes are not by their nature retirement income
schemes in the sense that they can provide socially adequate sums for the period of a worker's life when she or
he is no longer productive, the best that can be done
through them is to provide, as retirement income, that
part of wages earned which the employee does not
regard as absolutely necessary for her or his present consumption. That is, they can be adequate only in the
190

See the figures cited in supra note 4. The number of persons who
actually receive some job-related pension as opposed to return of
some of their contributions is truly small. From the Canadian
Labour Congress's Submission to the Royal Commission on the
Status of Pensions in Ontario, "Of all the retirees surveyed, 42.4
per cent of the men and 9.2 per cent of the women were receiving
some job related pension." If one notes that, as of 1974,
Statistics Canada's Pension Plans in Canada, 1974, Oct 74-401
showed that only 40.7 per cent of the work force was covered by
a private pension plan, a sense of the small number of real
benefits that the huge private pension schemes bestow can be
had. Further, the CLC in its submission goes on to point out that
pension participants do not benefit equally: "The incidence of
job related pensions varied among men from a high of 88.1 per
cent among former managers, professionals and technicians to
27.9 per cent among former primary blue collar
workers... Among former managerial and professional women,
65.0 per cent were receiving job related pensions compared to 5.0
per cent among former blue collar workers." Partly this disparity
is due to the longer job retention by managerial and professional
employees; partly it represents the point made in the text that
employers, as a collateral benefit to the creation of a pension
scheme, may be able to look better after their managers and executives. Finally, in as much as statutory provisions now provide
for more advantageous funding periods for employees, the
percentage of retirees receiving pension benefits ought to increase. But increases in unemployment may more than offset
gains made in this way.
From the CLC's above-cited submission, in turn relying on figures
published by Statistics Canada, Pension Plans In Canada, 1974,
Oct., 74-401: "In 1975 dollars, the $2105 average pension for
both sexes would have amounted to $2587 ($3100 in 1978
dollars), which was well below the poverty line." The same paper
compared the pre-retirement income of employer pension recipients with their pension income. More than half received less
than 30 per cent of their pre-retirement income, more than 35 per
cent received less than 20 per cent of their pre-retirement income.
If one of the benefits of a forced savings scheme is to avoid poverty of employees, the private pension schemes, so far, seem
poorly equipped to achieve this aim. For a dramatic and passionate plea to alleviate the epidemic of poverty of the retired in
Canada, see brief submitted by The Honourable Monique B6gin,
Minister of National Health and Welfare, Senate, Special Senate
Committee on Retirement Age Policies, Proceedings, No. 10
(Dec. 14, 1978) pp. 1-85.
CANADIAN TAXATION/WINTER, 1980

NON-EARNINGS RELATED RETIREMENT INCOME SCHEME

to calculate pension benefits and their costs on a basis
which includes inflation by changing some of their actuarial assumptions. But, even though this is
theoretically possible, to so cost a plan is fraught with
grave risks which private fund managers might not be
willing to run. In fact, the record of insurers generally
suggests that they do not want to accept them. To my
knowledge there are no insurance schemes which provide for benefits which are indexed to the rising costs of
living, with the sole exception of the Israeli no-fault
road accidents compensation scheme.'I This may be the
most fundamental difference between private and
public schemes. Thus, for instance, the New Zealand
no-fault accident compensation scheme is indexed to the
cost of living. But that scheme is government run. Professor Ison has pointed out that from an efficiency point
of view there is nothing to choose between private and
public schemes in terms of spreading the risk throughout society and, indeed, that it may well be true that
private schemes would be more efficiently run, but that
in the end their failure to cope properly with allocation
of risk in society arises from their unwillingness to allow
for rising prices at an uncertain rate.18

Even if we permit private sector
schemes to flourish and we buttress
them with better vesting, portability
and indexation provisions and, in addition, offer better benefits than they do
at present for surviving spouses and for
disabled persons, the private sector
plans will still fall well short of providing adequate retirement income for
our elderly people.
This unwillingness to index benefits has thus far
been demonstrated by private pension fund managers in
spades. In 1974, of over 15,000 employer based plans,
only 141 had provided even partial indexing. Of these
141 plans, 101 were private sector employers, covering 2
per cent of private sector plan participants.' 9 Thus, it is
of interest that the proponents of the private pension
schemes (who acknowledge that they must improve
those schemes' benefits) advocate that indexation
should take place but, in doing so, seek to provide some
kind of buffer for the private fund managers against
making wrong calculations. Knowing that I am oversimplifying, I will just comment on two of the more interesting recently proposed buffers. One is offered by
Pesando and Rae. 2 0 They suggest that benefits can be
supported by indexation and that fund managers, to
protect themselves against the risk so incurred, should
be able to purchase government bonds which would, in
turn, be indexed to the cost of living. Fund managers,
by purchasing such bonds, would be enabled to cover
themselves against risks which are unanticipated. From
CANADIAN TAXATION/WINTER, 1980

a private sector proponent's point of view, this scheme
presents a difficulty. At present, the plans' money is invested in privately issued bonds which are not indexed.
The issuing of indexed bonds by the government will
make non-indexed bonds much less attractive. In
theory, this could lead to a more competitive capital
market but, in practice, it seems unlikely that there will
be serious competition offered to a government which is
willing to issue inflation-proofed bonds. The cost of
meeting this challenge would be too high. The result
would be that in order for the private sector to attract
investment money, the government would have to become some kind of financial intermediary, having attracted much of the available incentive capital. That is,
the government would become a major source of private
enterprise capital funding. While this might not be objectionable to many, I have more than a hunch that
those people who favour private sector activity over
government activity would view such a development
with a jaundiced eye. Perhaps it is this kind of perceived
problem which led Pesando to make a second proposal
to encourage the indexation of pension plans in the
private sector.21
Pesando suggested that the government should insure part of the risk incurred by the provision of indexed
benefits in private pension plans. The apparent underpinning for this suggestion is that inflation is stable over
the long term and that it is only short-term fluctuations
which must be protected against. Thus, if inflation rises
3 per cent more in one period than could have been anticipated, money to cover the shortfall in pension benefits will be made available by the government through
this insurance scheme. When the risk, in due course,
falls 3 per cent below that which has been anticipated,
the government will be repaid. In that way there will be
no net losers, and it will be safe to index. But this
reasoning seems to have built into it an assumption
which may not be borne out in fact: that inflation will
stabilize over a long run period. It may not. If, for instance, it keeps steadily increasing for a long period, say
10 years, it may well be that the government will be the
true indexer of the private sector pension plan.
In any event, whatever the merit of my rudimentary
critique of these ingenious ideas, what everyone seems
to accept is that indexation is so risky that the private

And there, I believe, the government backs the indexation costs
of the scheme.
18. Ison, "The Politics of Reform in Personal Injury
Compensation," 27 University of Toronto Law J. 50, 385,
393-94 (1977). There are other substantial differences between
private and public insurance schemes. Private schemes are never
likely to be truly universal in coverage and they do not provide
adequately for rehabilitation and retraining; see Hasson and
Mesher, "No-Fault-Private or Social Insurance," 4 Industrial
Law J. 169 (1975).
19. Canadian Labour Congress Submission to the Commission on
the Status of Pensions in Ontario, supra note 15.
20. Pesando and Rae, supra note 6.
21. Pesando, supra note 6.
17.
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sector pension plans are unlikely to be able to develop
adequate indexation of benefits unless they receive some
guarantees to offset the risks which have to be taken. If
that is so, the question arises as to why the private sector
should be given the right to offer pension schemes when
they are not willing to bear the full freight. 2 2

II Private Versus Public
Fear of Greyness
If the private sector finds it so difficult to provide
adequate benefits for people who are retired, why
should there be so much agitation for the continuation
of the private sector schemes - even though it might
mean modifying them to such an extent that they will be
unrecognizable by their originators? I think the agitation has a lot to do with ideology. Take, for instance,
the recent writing of Professor William R. Waters of the
University of Toronto, who is the Chairman of the
Private Sector Task Force on Retirement Income Issues.
After giving a couple of examples of the inflexibility of
public plans when compared to private plans,2 3 he went
on to say:

income (cPP/OPP/OAS/GIS), the present situation would
be even more dismal."5
Coming now to grips with the argument that, while
private sector planning has not 'brought home the goods'
so far, it is nevertheless capable of doing so, let us
return to some of the earlier subject matter covered. In
order to give better benefits, private pension plans have
to improve conditions in respect of vesting, portability
and indexation. It is going to be very difficult to convince fund managers that this ought to be done.
Naturally, they will be prepared to offer such improvements if the costs are borne by the contributors.
These costs will be considerable. To exemplify this, note
that some hard-pressed private sector plans have sought
to better portability criteria. These efforts show that,
unless there is concentrated activity (and, dare I say it,
even direct legislative interference) the private sector
schemes are going to fall far short of providing adequate portability provisions. Thus, John J. Breithaupt,

22.

Having concluded universal approaches to the provision of
retirement income are flawed, I must make it clear that I do
not believe that most private sector plans as they are
presently constituted, provide a clearly preferable alternative to universal plans. However, I do believe that, with
reasonable changes, private sector plans offer a far more
pleasing mosaic than the universal shade of grey that would
result from expanded coverage of publicly sponsored
plans. 2 4

This is a representative illustration of how the precepts
of individualism and free choice - undoubted 'goods'
- are considered to be undermined by the possibility
that plans underwritten by government may replace
private pension schemes.
In addition to the fear that individuality, will be
eroded, it is generally assumed by the proponents of
private enterprise that the private sector is more efficient in providing pensions than the public sector.
In this section of the paper I will address mypelf to
both of these notions.

Improvement of Private Sector Plans
and Likely Developments
It is worth repeating that the adequacy of the
private sector plans has arisen because of these plans'
manifest failure to provide adequate benefits for retired
employees. This is so despite the fact that private enterprise is supposed to be efficient because of the competitive element. Why has not this guiding spirit of free
enterprise led the private pension system to raise
retirement incomes to a plateau which is acceptable
to our society? Indeed, if it had not been for the modest
legislative interference which we have had, supplemented by government action in respect of retirement
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23.

24.
25.

After this paper was substantially completed the Government of
Canada report was released: Task Force on Retirement Income
Policy, The Retirement Income System in Canada: Problems
and Alternative Policies in Reform (Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Services, 1980). In respect of inflation-proofing four suggestions were made, all supporting the text above. Two of the proposed alternatives envisage legislation requiring employers to
guarantee certain inflation-proofing, one imposing slightly more
risk on the pensioner than the other. That is, whether the market
will bear it or not, private pension schemes would be forced to
partially index. It is not easy to see how these alternatives could
politically be implemented. The private sector's reluctance to
bear the cost of indexation was also suspected to be total by the
United Steelworkers of America (CLc) who in their Submission
to the Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario
wrote that the feasibility of government-indexed securities for
sale to the private sector ought to be considered but that "we are
inclined to believe that most backers of this idea are really seeking government guarantees for private investment." In a similar
vein, cN in its submission to the Special Senate Committee on
Retirement Age Policies, supra note 9, pointed out that the cost
of indexation was staggering, that it could "only be met to a very
small degree through a supplementary contribution payable by
members of the plans" and that to force private pension plans to
index would be to stop the spreading of pension plans to the 60
per cent of private sector employees not yet covered. CN concluded that "government alone can deal with so costly and
widespread a phenomenon of our society." Clearly proposals for
government backing for private sector plan indexation are much
more likely to win support. The Task force's third and fourth
alternatives proposed - the stabilization facility and the real annuity rate scheme - do require the government to insure funds
against short term inflation, that is, they are variations on the
suggestion made by Pesando described in the text.
Professor Waters did concede that these manifestations of rigidity were insignificant. Guilt by association arguments are useful
when making unsubstantiated claims!
Waters, "Improved Pensions Still Have a Role," 7 The Canadian
Business Rev. 44 (1980).
The situation is intolerable by any standard. Without going into
great detail, note the extent of poverty amongst the old. "In
1975, 61 per cent of unattached senior citizens and 22 per cent of
elderly couples were below the poverty lines." See brief submitted by The Honourable Monique B6gin, supra note 16, p. 8.
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reporting proudly on the development by the Canadian
Life Insurance Association of a system of portability
writes as follows:
... one of the questions that obviously arises is cost. There
are at least five good reasons why the cost of a company's
adopting the portability plan cannot be determined in advance. The first four have to do with the wide variation
among plans and the factors which effect cost. These are
the differences in the pension plan provisions, the vesting
provisions, the employee turnover rate, and the transfer
payment formula chosen. The first factor that makes the
cost so unpredictable is uncertainty as to how employees
will react to portability. If employees continue to take out
their own contributions on termination the cost will be
negligible. The more that employees opt for portability, the
greater the cost. What employees will do cannot be predicted until portability comes available to them. An
estimate of cost based on a company's particular circumstances can be made. As indicated earlier, a system offers employers sufficient latitude so that the cost can be
digested a bit at a time - due to different termination dates
of individual employees - rather than at one gulp. One
thing is certain, however - portability doesn't come free.
In keeping with the idea of slowly digesting the cost, portability is being extended at the outset only to salaried
employees, and in most cases, only to head office
employees of these companies. 26

It would seem that, for efficiency of administration, it is very likely that as plans get closer to providing
immediate vesting, full portability and indexation, costs
can only be kept down if there is increasing similarity
among various plans. 27 That is, the very means sought
to be used to save the private sector schemes have in
them the germs for developments which will inflict on
the private sector plans the blight that opponents of
governmental interference see in all government activity: the failure to recognize the need for individualism
and free choice, leading to 'greyness.'
Further, administration of plans in which portability has become an important feature will require a central clearing house so that portability can be effectively
managed. That is, there will be a need for central keeping of records and fund accounting. The question that
then arises is whether there will be any further need for
private investment managers? After all, much of what
private managers do relates to the administration of
particular plans and the investment of the accounted for
funds. Why could not an appropriate centralized manager do all of this for all funds?
I presume that the argument to keep investment
management in the hands of the private sector is that
this will ensure that investments will be made in the
most efficient way possible, whereas if investment was
left to a bureaucratic, governmentally managed agency
there would be no incentive to make good investment
choices. Further, there is a real social-political difficulty
in that many people would consider the impact of the
government's new power to directly interfere in the
market with these large aggregations of capital obtained
from the private sector to be potentially harmful. This
notion, that the creation of a governmental pool of
capital is a danger in itself, is another aspect of the objections that private sector plan proponents have to
CANADIAN TAXATION/WINTER, 1980

governmental plans. I cannot, in this context, grapple
with the ideological difficulties that arise out of this
issue. It is very important, however, because it underlies
(covertly perhaps) so much of the opposition to public
retirement schemes. I will content myself, therefore,
with pointing out that just as there are many people
perhaps who are concerned about the possible abuse the
government would make of large sums of new capital,
there are also many people who are concerned about the
possible abuses inherent in the private sector having
such a large sum of capital available to it as a result of
the existence of private pension plans. Let me briefly illustrate the nature of this latter concern.
At present, unions, on behalf of employees, permit
employers and fund managers to capitalize private
enterprise with funds raised from the wages of the
employees they represent. Assuming for the moment
that this is an efficient way of capitalizing enterprise in
our society, notice the social-political impact from the
union-employee point of view. For those members of
this group who believe that the employer/employee relationship is an aspect of class warfare, it must seem
rather strange that, having fought very hard to obtain a
particular wage, it is to be given back to the enemy in
order that the enemy may use it to exploit other workers
(perhaps themselves as well). Even for those who do not
see our society as one in which class warfare is being
fought, it is not obvious that much of the investment in
private enterprise is for the benefit of employees. For instance, is it clear that workers benefit from the fact that
their funds are being used to boost industries which hide
behind high tariff walls, causing prices for goods and
services they need to increase? Is it so obvious that
workers benefit from living in a society where enterprises that pollute or make shoddy products have
managed to flourish because of the investment they
received from private pension plans to which workers
contributed? Is it manifest that workers benefit from investment, made with their money, in technological
devices which diminish employment opportunities or
create employment opportunities which rob workers of
their dignity? Are workers served when their funds are
used to invest in firms that engage in union-busting?
Thus, unless private fund management is overwhelmingly more efficient than public fund manage-

26.

Breithaupt, "Resolving the Portability Problem," 7 The Canadian Business Rev. 46, 48 (1980).
27. The brief to the Special Senate Committee on Retirement Age
Policies, submitted by Amoco Canada Petroleum Company Ltd.,
see supra note 9, p. 10, argued that the idea of increased portability is "superficially intriguing, but it ignores the formidable
array of technical and administrative difficulties which would
arise. It also implies that every employer would be required to
have a pension plan, since it would hardly be fair to impose portability only on those companies now offering plans to their
employees. Of more significance is the fact that the introduction
of portability might impair an employer's ability to design a plan
of a type which best secures the interest of its employees."
193

NON-EARNINGS RELATED RETIREMENT INCOME SCHEME

ment,2 8 the question of whether an investment pool
ought to be private or public is a political one, not an
economic one. In that light, the arguments in the private
versus public debate are essentially political and should
not be debated exclusively or even mainly in the context
of cost-benefit analysis.
As an alternative suggestion, to disarm those
alarmed by the thought of on-rushing public enterprise,
I would point out that even if pension schemes in the
private sector became so uniform that a governmental
clearing house eventuated, or if a governmental pension
scheme run on similar basis to the ones operated by the

[T]he question of whether an investment pool ought to be private or public
is a political one, not an economic one.
private sector was created, this would not necessarily
mean the creation of a government pool of capital with
the political implications of the kind discussed above
and which are apparently feared so much by private
enterprise. An arrangement could be made whereby
government agencies could auction off chunks of the
money collected through a government-administered
pension plan to private fund and investment
managers.This would create competition among the
bidders for the government capital and thus lead to,
supposedly, an efficient allocation of these funds. If we
were politically so minded, we could ask the government
to tie a string to the private fund management bidders.
That is, in the same way the government requires
tenderers for certain government contract work to pay
certain wage rates and provide certain conditions, it
could require successful bidders for the investment of
government administered pension funds not to use the
obtained capital to invest in enterprises which are, say,
unacceptable polluters. Such control over investment of
the pooled money could also be used to affect the
regional distribution of investment. Thus it could be
used as a powerful instrument in the pursuit of national
objectives.
In sum, those proponents of private sector pension
plans who are seriously interested in improving them in
order to ensure their survival, invariably find themselves
making recommendations which undermine their own
ideological justification for the schemes' retention. As
well, the notion of a large pool of funds in government
hands - a possible outcome - is not axiomatically evil,

nor is it to be feared.

A Proposal for a Public
Non-Earnings Related Scheme 29
Even if we permit private sector schemes to flourish
and we buttress them with better vesting, portability and
indexation provisions and, in addition, offer better
benefits than they do at present for surviving spouses
194

and for disabled persons, the private sector plans will
still fall well short of providing adequate retirement income for our elderly people. They would not cover nonwage workers, such as homemakers. They would not
cover workers who are unable to find work. They would
inadequately cover low-wage workers, seasonal and
secondary earners. Thus, if we are truly interested in
providing a decent standard of living for people of a certain age, even though they are no longer productive, or
were never directly involved in wage-labour situations,
private sector plans will not do the job. This is so
because private pension schemes, being wage deferral
schemes, have a limited coverage: they are not aimed at
providing universal old age security. Also, as I have
argued, even accepting their limited coverage, such
retirement schemes are seen by employers as having
quite a different set of primary purposes than the provision of adequate retirement income for participating
employees. Thus, the saviours of private enterprise
plans are attempting to make them into something for
which they were not designed.
The question for me thus has been: Does the problem of providing for the elderly truly raise questions in
respect of the creation and refinements of private pension plans or a question of how much social security
needs to be provided by the State?
I think that Bernstein said it all when he pointed
out that social security
has never lost a penny to a dishonest trustee, never paid a
kick-back to a union or management official, never failed
to pay off for lack of funding, can readily be made to keep
up with increases in the cost of living, pays off to widows
and children and other dependents when a worker dies,
retires or becomes disabled. In sum, social security is
dependable where private pensions are undependable. Its
weakness is benefits that are too low. But there is no easier,
no cheaper, no more dependable way to improve retirement
30
income than through social security.

A scheme for universal coverage for people who
reach a particular age and who have retired from the
workforce or who were never in it can be organized very
simply. All that needs to be done is to provide that
everyone who reaches a certain age is entitled to a set
proportion of the average wage earned in the nation in
that year. The actual proportion is, of course, vital but

28.

The idea that private sector management would be more efficient
is so much part of the conventional wisdom it seems foolish to
challenge it. But it is of interest that private pension fund
managers averaged 6.6 per cent return on their investments between 1963 and 1977, whereas the Toronto Stock Exchange index
showed a yield of 7.3 per cent and 90 day finance paper 6.8 per
cent over the same period. See Wente, "The New Power of the
Pension Funds," 53 Canadian Business (No. 3) 33 (1980).
29. I wish to acknowledge that the discussion which follows in this
section has benefitted from conversations with Professor F.
Lazar of York University. I remain responsible for any errors in
logic and reasoning.
30. Bernstein, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Labour, U.S.
Senate, June 14, 1972 as cited by Nader and Blackwell, supra
note 14, p. 118.
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requires a relatively simple political decision. I would
propose that somewhere between 40 to 60 per cent of the
average annual income would be a sensible amount. The
system would be a pay-as-you-go system, whereby funds
to be paid out to beneficiaries would be raised by taxes
levied in that year.

Arguments Which Need To Be Addressed
The advantages of a scheme of social security as
opposed to an earnings-related pension scheme (whether
private or public) are that it is automatically indexed in
a very sound way, and that it does away with all the problems of vesting, portability, insolvencies and the need
to have special schemes for the provision of retirement
income for survivors of income-earners and for disabled
people. Provision can be made for people who cannot
be provided for in any earnings-related scheme. In addition, it is possible to use such a scheme for regional income adjustments, if that is a desideratum sought to be
achieved.
Apart from ideology, the strongest argument
against such a scheme is simply that it will be too costly.
It is not clear that this is a very persuasive argument at
all.
The universal kind of scheme that is being proposed in this paper would lead to the abolishment of the
CPP/QPP schemes which are earnings related. This would

leave more wages in the take-home pay pocket of people
so that the burden of the extra amounts which they
would be taxed to support the universal scheme will be
lightened. 3 1 Similarly, the old age security and the
guaranteed income supplement would no longer have to
be funded. Also, if such a scheme were implemented it
may become possible to reduce government expenditures on such things as housing and health subsidies,
which are presently given to the needy, many of whom,
of course, are retired people.3 2 And, of course, contributions to private sector plans would no longer be
necessary: both employer and employee contributions
could be paid in wages. Thus, my first point is that some
of the additional costs of a universal scheme will be offset by savings from reductions in existing government
expenditures.
Secondly, the increase in tax burden necessitated by a
universal scheme will be further offset by the fact that
there will be less need for people to save over and above
what they contribute at present to the private and public
pension schemes.
Overall, then, the proposed scheme may not mean
that there will need to be any, or, in any event a large
reduction in spending power for most tax-payers. In
particular, one has to note that the counterproposal to
the kind that I am making is an increase in private sector
plan costs which, of course, would force greater saving
on employees than they make at present and, therefore,
would certainly reduce the spending power of such
employees. In this context, it is necessary to address,
briefly, another argument which might be made in opposition to a universal scheme. It is that if people do not
CANADIAN TAXATION/WINTER, 1980

save (whether they are compelled to do so or do so
voluntarily) an important reserve of potential investment capital will be lost and, thereby, enterprise will be
inhibited. I have argued that there will be no such
drastic reduction in saving power, but for the moment I
will assume that there might be.
It seems to me that investment is attracted by the
possibility of making profit. Enterprise is not induced
by the mere fact of having large sums of capital lying
around in savings accounts. If I am right, then it ought
to follow that where there is a possibility of a profitable
venture the inducement to make capital available will be
strong enough to guarantee money coming forward
whether or not it otherwise would have been saved.
Theoretically, there might be a point at which people are
so burdened by the impact of taxation that even the
possibility of making a profit would not permit them to
save. The scheme that I propose seems to leave circumstances well short of that theoretical possibility. In
any event, much is made of the fact that Canadians have
been saving much more than their neighbours to the
south. Yet, whenever I turn to economic discussions on
television or read them in newspapers, I find economic
advisors complaining bitterly about the fact that too few
people in Canada seem to be using that capital for
profit-risk ventures. This may well be an indication that
the existence of large amounts of financial capital do
not guarantee investment. The possibility of a good
return does that; it will generate investment funds.
Another advantage of financing a comprehensive
social security plan is that it can be made much more
equitable than the present private sector pension plans.
If the scheme is financed through the income tax
system, the proposed raising of revenue by taxation to
benefit retired people will be progressive. In addition,
the scheme would do away with the need for the government to entice people to put money aside for their retirement in registered retirement savings plans through taxation measures which are clearly regressive in their impact."

31.

An important gain would be the abolition of the imposition of a
tax burden which is manifestly regressive. See National Council
of Welfare, Bearing the Burden, Sharing the Benefit (Ottawa,
1978).
32. There is a strong correlation between adequacy of income and
health. Thus, Retirement in Canada: Summary Report (Health
and Welfare Canada, 1977) reports that "about 60 per cent of
retired men and 56 per cent of retired women with adequate incomes had adequate health compared to only 16 per cent of men
and 21 per cent of women with inadequate incomes." Similarly,
housing costs are so high that persons with inadequate income at
present need help. Provinces have had to play an increasingly
larger role in the provision of housing or rental supplements, tax
credits and grants. Institutional dwelling is also heavily subsidized. See Economic Council of Canada, One in Three: Pensions
for Canadians to 2030 (Ottawa, 1979), p. 12.
33. The regressive nature of these measures has been incontrovertibly established in National Council of Welfare, The Hidden
Welfare System (Ottawa, 1976).
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I now turn to what is the most oft-raised argument
to support the notion that costs will escalate if pension
plans are made too generous, let alone if a universal
social security scheme is created. This is what I think of
as the lingering grandparents bogey. We have been told
repeatedly that, because of the famous baby boom, we
are facing a period during which the proportion of
retired people to young working people in the population will be dramatically increased. The Economic
Council of Canada's Report, One in Three, opens up
with such an assertion (as indeed do most commentaries
on the problem of the provision of retirement incomes):
By the time today's high school students reach the age of
retirement - around the year 2030 - approximately I out
of every 5 Canadians will be 65 years old or over, compared
with roughly I out of every 10 now. At the same time, the
proportion of elderly people among the population age 20
and over could jump from about I in 7 now to nearly 1 in 3,
50 years hence. 3 '

The sonorous tones in which such sombre messages are
delivered are clearly meant to lead to the following conclusion: we cannot really provide adequately for all
elderly people in future.

[P]rivate sector plans suffer from the
blight that opponents of governmental
interference see in all government activity: the failure to recognize the need
for individualism and free choice, leading to 'greyness.'
Firstly, let me point out that there are countries
with a greater proportion of retired people in their
population than we have in Canada.35 As far as I can
tell they have not ground to a halt nor, do I believe, is
the incidence of poverty among old people in these comparatively industrialized countries as great as it is in
Canada at present. This must lead one to doubt the proposition that the potential of a decreasing ratio between
the income earners and retirees presents an insuperable
problem.
Secondly, it strikes me that the way that the proposition is phrased is not quite as honest or as careful as
it ought to be. Usually the ratio is calculated on the basis
of total population, that is, the number of people over a
certain age (the retirees) compared to all the other people over a certain age up to the retirement age (the income earners). The proportion of those out of the
workforce to those in the workforce is not calculated.
Yet, why should one assume that the profile of the
workforce will be the same as it is now? Is it not possible, indeed, likely, that many people who are not in the
workforce at present will enter into it as the years
develop? For instance, the increase in female labour
participation is not diminishing, but increasing. Thus, it
would follow that the number of people between 20 and
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65 in the population who are actually in the workforce
might increase dramatically and, therefore, the decrease
in the ratio between people over 65 and those over 20 in
the workforce may not be as alarming as the doomsayers would have us believe.36
In a similar vein, the statement that the ratio is going to decrease so much that we will not be able to provide for elderly people without imposing an unbearable
burden on the workforce loses some of its validity when
one realizes that retirement age is a flexible notion and
that the present retirement age may not be the same as a
future one. It is quite possible that, as our technology
develops, people may be able to work for considerably
longer periods without as much strain and with much
more enjoyment than they do now. Indeed, given a
social security system of the kind proposed, it is more
likely that practical plans to train people to partake in
productive activities will emerge. There will be a strong
financial incentive to promote such planning.
Yet another factor which diminishes the strength of
the argument that the consequences of the baby boom
prevent us from making adequate provision for elderly
people is that, just as the number or proportion of old
people in society will increase, the proportion of young
people will decrease. The consequence of this will be
that people who are actually in the workforce will have
fewer young dependents to support than they do now.3 1
As a result, the argument that the burden imposed on
them by having to provide for elderly people who up to
now would not have had to be provided for is again
diminished in force.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the implicit assumption that this increase in proportion of
retired people to those in the workforce will take place
all of a sudden. That is not so. It will be a gradual process. If we assume that under a universal social security
scheme based on a fixed taxation impost the propor-

34.
35.

36.
37.

One in Three: Pensionsfor Canadians to 2030, supra note 32,
p.3.
The percentage of population over 65 in 1977 in East Germany
was 16, Sweden and Austria 15, Norway, Belgium, France, West
Germany, United Kingdom 14, Denmark, Luxemburg 13,
Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Greece, Italy 12,
Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium 11, United States, Finland, Spain
Portugal 10, Cyprus, Barbados, Uruguay, Iceland, Poland,
Romania, Malta, New Zealand, U.S.S.R. 9, Canada 8. These
figures are taken from the submission made by Dr. David Ross
to the Senate: Senate Special Committee on Retirement Age
Policies, Proceedings, No. 11 (Jan. 23, 1979), p. 4.
The calculus will also be affected by changes in immigration
policy.
David Ross has calculated that the present working age population (18-64) is 59.5 per cent of the total population. Interpreting
Statistics Canada's predictions, Ross shows that, by 2031, the
population's retirees will have jumped from the present 8 per
cent to 20 per cent. By that time, however, the expected much
lower birthrate will diminish the proportion of those aged 0-17,
leaving the working-age population (18-64) at 59.9 per cent,
almost the same as it is today. See supra note 35, p. 3.
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tional growth in the average pension equals the proportion of growth in the average wage minus the growth in
the proportion of the average number of pensioners, it
follows that, unless there is an enormous growth in the
number of pensioners in any one year, the pay-as-yougo system will not require much adjustment annually to
keep the pension benefits at a constant level. This allows
for counter-planning, for instance, by adjustment in the
use of manpower in society as well as by re-training of
the elderly to adapt to new technologies. Similarly, tax
rates can be adjusted and (only if need be) the benefits
allowed to retired people may, ever so slowly, be
diminished. That is, the universal social security system
envisaged is capable of handling the consequences that
the much ballyhooed baby boom might have on retirement income.

that with the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social
security system this source of cheap finance will dry up.
Apart from the first mentioned group (which encompasses a variety of people), there does not seem to
be too much to say for the opponents of social security
type schemes. They are merely interested in their own
self-interest, even if it is to be fostered at the expense of
people who have spent all of their lives producing the
wealth a good chunk of which they so eagerly seek to expropriate.
In sum, private pension schemes or, indeed,
government pension schemes based on contributions
from workers' earnings cannot:
provide for immediate vesting;
adequately provide for portability;
provide full indexation of benefits;
provide adequate survivors' benefits or
disability benefits;
(5) provide guarantees against insolvency; or
(6) provide retirement income for people who never
enter the wage-earning labour force.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

III Conclusion
A social security system has been advocated for a
number of reasons. Even if it turns out to be more expensive than I anticipate, the question I would put is:
what else can we do for people who are no longer productive in our society, in the sense of not being capable
of earning wages? They do not deserve to be as poorly
treated as the private pension plans plus the earningsrelated government plans would have them be.
In one last swipe at the agitators for the continuation of our present scheme (albeit they have adopted
reformers' guises) let me note who the real opponents of
a change to a government-run, universal social security
scheme might be. First and foremost are the ideologues
who fear the effect of losing yet another function, which
had formerly been left to the anarchy of private enterprise, to a planned society mechanism. It is they whom I
respect most, because their opposition is, at bottom, not
rooted in false intellectual argument but in something
approaching a sincere and devout religious belief. Then
there are those who profit from the present scheme who,
of course, are the fund managers, in particular insurance companies, trust companies and banks." And
finally, the greatest opponents of the abandonment of

At least, they cannot achieve these aims under present
conditions. If costs were increased enormously, private
pension schemes could take care of some of the problems. As has been indicated, the tab will have to be picked up (especially in respect of indexation costs and insurance to guard against insolvency of either employers
or funds)3 9 by some kind of government funding. But
no matter how they are structured, no matter how high
the costs accepted, they will still leave large numbers of
the elderly population without benefits. Apparently the
State is to look after them. The argument has been that
there is no reason why the State should not provide for
all people, at a cost which can be spread in a progressive
manner throughout society.

38.

the present earnings-related CPP/QPP systems are, of

course, the provinces who are getting a large amount of
their revenue from borrowing from these federally held
funds at low interest rates. They fear, quite naturally,

39.

For an instructive comment on how lucrative the business is, see
Wente, "The New Power of the Pension Funds," 53 Canadian
Business (No. 3) 33 (1980) and Lecky, "The Tasteful Success of
Andr6 Molnar," 53 Canadian Business (No. 3) 42 (1980).
Time and space did not permit discussion of this problem. The
issues are raised at length by Bernstein, supra note 10 and
Fichaud, supra note 13.

Shifting the Tax Burden to Families
Recently, attention has been drawn to the power of taxation in creatingpoverty. As well
as taxing people at a lower and lower level of income, the tax burden has also been shifting
from single people and childless couples onto tax payers with children, irrespective of their
level of income. Admittedly taxation has increasedfor all groups of the population, but the
increase has been placed disproportionatelyon households with children.
F. Field, FairShares for Families
(London: Study Commission on the Family, 1980)
CANADIAN TAXATION/WINTER, 1980
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